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Abstract 
 
Why do so many Americans hold misperceptions? We examine two factors that contribute to the 
prevalence of these beliefs. First, presenting correct information should reduce misperceptions, 
especially if provided in a clear and compelling format. We therefore test the effect of graphical 
information, which may be especially effective in facilitating belief updating about changes in 
quantities over time. In some cases, though, people may reject information because it threatens their 
worldview or self-concept – a mechanism that can be revealed by affirming individuals’ self-worth, 
which could make them more willing to acknowledge uncomfortable facts. We test both 
mechanisms jointly. In three experiments, we find that providing information in graphical form 
reduces misperceptions. A third study shows that this effect is greater than for equivalent textual 
information. Our findings for self-affirmation are more equivocal. We find limited evidence that 
self-affirmation can help diminish misperceptions when no other information is provided, but it 
does not consistently increase willingness to accept corrective information as previous research in 
social psychology would suggest. These results suggest that misperceptions are caused by a lack of 
information as well as psychological threat, but that these factors may interact in ways that are not 
yet well understood. 
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Why do people so often fail to learn relevant facts about politics or update the inaccurate factual 
beliefs that they hold? Surveys show incorrect or factually unsupported beliefs about politics are 
widespread. From myths about “death panels” to skewed beliefs about the economy, misperceptions 
can distort public debate and warp people’s preferences over policies and candidates (Althaus 1998, 
Gilens 2001, Bartels 2002, Kull et. al 2003/2004, Nyhan and Reifler 2012). Given these perverse 
consequences, determining why so many Americans are misinformed is a vital task for social science.  
In this article, we consider two hypotheses about the prevalence of misperceptions and how 
they might interact. First, people may not have encountered accurate information about an issue or 
encountered it in formats that easily allow for counter-argument (e.g., Nyhan and Reifler 2010). 
Under this view, the format in which information is delivered could substantially affect 
misperceptions. Graphic presentation of data may be an especially potent form of communication 
when communicating structure or statistical relationships (Meyer et al. 1999). For example, line 
graphs (which our experiments use) convey how quantities of interest change over time whereas bar 
graphs are well suited to making comparisons across groups. When the presentation matches the 
structure in what Zacks and Tversky call “bar-line message correspondence” (1999: 1073), then 
communication should be particularly effective. 
Exposure to accurate information may not be enough, however; people’s mindsets when 
they think about their factual beliefs are also likely to contribute to misperceptions about 
controversial issues. Directionally motivated reasoning appears to be the default way in which 
people process (political) information (e.g., Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Kunda 1990; Redlawsk 
2002; Taber and Lodge 2006). Misperceptions often fit comfortably in people’s worldviews in this 
sense by seeming to confirm people’s prior beliefs (Kahan 2015). 
On high-profile issues, many of the misinformed are likely to have already encountered and 
rejected correct information that was discomforting to their self-concept or worldview (Steele 1988). 
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Could some people potentially accept unwelcome facts in a different frame of mind? For instance, 
accuracy motivations can supplant directional motivations under certain conditions (e.g., Bolsen and 
Druckman 2015). From this perspective, buttressing people’s self-worth could potentially help them 
acknowledge uncomfortable facts without any new information. Such a finding would suggest that 
people deny facts they might otherwise accept because of the psychological threat that they pose.  
These explanations have broad potential implications for how we understand the causes of 
inaccurate factual beliefs as well as approaches to reducing them. To the extent that misperceptions 
are rooted in failures of information delivery, presenting corrective messages in convenient and 
accessible formats should reduce misperceptions. Such a finding would indicate that people are not 
sufficiently exposed to persuasive and accurate factual information. By contrast, if misperceptions 
are more rooted in self-identity, people with inaccurate beliefs are likely to resist threatening 
information when they think about it or are presented with it, suggesting that identity threat is the 
key mechanism. (As we discuss below, these explanations are not mutually exclusive.) 
 We test both approaches and their interaction in three experiments concerning issues for 
which some citizens may be unwilling to acknowledge factual information that contradicts their 
preexisting beliefs. In each study, we independently randomize whether participants receive 
information in a graphical format and whether they receive a self-affirmation treatment, a procedure 
that allows us to measure the counterfactual of how people might react if they were buttressed 
against identity threat from politically uncomfortable facts.  
We find that delivering corrective information in graphical form successfully decreases 
reported misperceptions relative to controls in all three studies. In Study 3, we additionally show that 
a graph reduces misperceptions more than equivalent text. We also find limited evidence that self-
affirmation can reduce false responses to factual questions among respondents who might find an 
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accurate answer to be threatening relative to controls. These findings suggest that some misinformed 
individuals may already be at least tacitly aware of the correct information but uncomfortable 
acknowledging it. If so, misperceptions are not just an information problem; the threatening nature 
of certain facts may also inhibit people from acknowledging the true state of the evidence on 
controversial issues. However, we find little evidence that self-affirmation increases receptivity to 
corrective information. We discuss the implications of this finding, which contradicts past research 
in social psychology, further in the conclusion.   
 
Theoretical approach  
One of the simplest explanations for the prevalence of misperceptions is that factual information 
has not been encountered and encoded by many members of the public. One challenge for 
remedying information deficits is that even respondents who are exposed to facts may not 
successfully process them and/or update their beliefs due to limits on their attention, motivation, or 
capacity to understand complex political information (e.g., Zaller 1992, Lupia and McCubbins 1998). 
To test the effects of providing information on misperceptions, we therefore rely primarily on 
graphs, which we expect could reduce misinformation more effectively than text. The idea that 
graphical data would be compelling and persuasive is hardly new. Washburne (1927) claimed that, 
except for trying to remember specific values, graphs were better than tables in nearly all other 
instances. More recently and closer to political science, prominent voices have championed the use 
of graphs as a way to facilitate understanding of data and models (e.g., Gelman et al. 2002). Despite 
the intuitive appeal of these accounts, results from experimental studies are mixed (see Meyer et al 
1999: 571 and Vessey 1991 for reviews). Given the contested nature of this literature in psychology 
and decision sciences, we explicitly test the effectiveness of graphs versus text in Study 3.  
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One criticism of studies that do not find that graphs communicate information more 
effectively is that they often rely on random data, whereas social data often have structure. Our 
primary justification for the use of graphs comes from Meyer et al. (1999) and their argument that 
graphical data are likely to be effective because they communicate the inherent structure of change 
over time. The power of visual information to convey relationships like this is sometimes referred to 
as visual statistical learning (VSL). While the findings from psychology are well documented, the 
testing paradigm is typically very abstract (e.g., Fiser and Aislin 2002). Our studies therefore provide 
an important test case for the power of graphs about real topics rather than abstract studies in a lab.  
Another factor that may contribute to the prevalence of misperceptions is the psychological 
mindset with which people consider factual questions about controversial issues (either when 
considering their own beliefs or processing new information). People tend to evaluate information 
with a directional bias toward their existing beliefs, interpreting ambiguous or mixed information as 
consistent with those views and resisting or rejecting counter-attitudinal information (e.g., Lord, 
Ross, and Lepper 1979, Kunda 1990, Taber and Lodge 2006).  
Why do individuals so often engage in motivated resistance to politically uncomfortable 
facts? Steele (1988) offers a novel psychological explanation for this phenomenon. According to his 
account, individuals are motivated to protect their general self-integrity from threat, including 
unwelcome information that calls their beliefs and attitudes into question.1 As such, they tend to 
reject such information or interpret it in a favorable manner. In this view, individuals who encounter 
threatening information are motivated to restore their feelings of self-worth; resolving dissonance is 
one way to accomplish this goal. Steele finds that individuals who affirmed personally important 
                                                
1  The concept of self-worth or self-integrity, which is central to self-affirmation theory, is theoretically and 
empirically distinct from self-esteem (see, e.g., Cohen et al. 2004). We focus instead on Steele’s theory of the 
motive to protecting feelings of one’s self-worth (1988). 
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values and thereby felt secure in their self-worth did not engage in dissonance reduction, suggesting 
that their need to do so had been eliminated. Likewise, Cohen et al. (2000) find that self-affirmation 
reduces motivated reasoning about controversial political issues. 
Self-affirmation is a novel approach in political science that allows us to test a potentially 
important explanation for the prevalence of motivated reasoning about politics, including 
misperceptions. Acknowledging the inaccuracy of misperceptions on controversial issues may be 
especially likely to stimulate self-integrity threat and spur motivated reasoning. Rejection of 
uncomfortable facts is a form of defensive processing that protects one’s self-identity; when one’s 
self-integrity is affirmed in some other domain, people may be less likely to respond defensively. 
If this account is correct, then motivated reasoning about facts may be driven less by the 
dissonance between one’s political views and the evidence in question than by the implications of 
that evidence for one’s self-worth or integrity. For instance, the persistence of the myth that Barack 
Obama was not born in the U.S. cannot plausibly be attributed to a lack of information given how 
frequently it has been debunked. It seems more likely that conceding the validity of Obama’s birth in 
the U.S. would require accepting the president’s legitimacy, which would be threatening to so-called 
“birthers.” We therefore hypothesize that it is threatening for people to acknowledge potentially 
uncomfortable facts about controversial issues, which hinders them from expressing belief in those 
facts. We test this hypothesis in two ways that are encoded in our experimental designs (described 
further below). First, we test whether self-affirmation makes people better able to acknowledge 
uncomfortable facts by comparing estimating its effect on reported misperceptions among 
respondents who may otherwise be uncomfortable providing the correct answer (the main effect of 
self-affirmation). Second, we test whether participants are more willing to accept corrective 
information they would otherwise resist or reject if affirmed (self-affirmation’s interactive effect). 
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Expectations 
We expect that presenting accurate information in graphical form will reduce misperceptions versus 
both a control condition (in each study below) and when directly compared to equivalent text (Study 
3). To accomplish this, we test the effects of presenting graphical information about changes in 
quantities over time visually rather than in words – a decision motivated by limits on available survey 
time in Study 1 (a lengthy textual treatment would not have been possible) and previous research 
finding limited or negative effects of textual corrections (e.g., Nyhan and Reifler 2010). In addition, 
we expect self-affirmation will reduce misperceptions among participants not assigned to receive 
corrective information who are motivated to hold incorrect beliefs on a given issue. Buttressing 
people’s self-worth should lower the psychic cost of accepting uncomfortable facts. Finally, we 
expect self-affirmation will change how respondents respond to corrective information. Previous 
studies suggest that self-affirmation should reduce biased processing of information, though they 
typically do not test a design in which self-affirmation is crossed with an information treatment.  
 
Study 1: The troop surge in Iraq 
After the 2006 elections, the Bush administration adopted a new Iraq war strategy known as “the 
surge” that included a substantial increase in U.S. troops and changes in counterinsurgency tactics. 
Civilian fatalities and insurgent attacks against coalition forces declined dramatically afterward. It is 
not clear how much the public knew about conditions in Iraq after the surge began. Perceptions of 
the success of the surge and war effort more generally did improve somewhat by fall 2008 (the 
period when the study was conducted), but remained relatively low. For instance, according to 
ABC/Washington Post polls, perceptions the US was “making significant progress toward restoring 
civil order in Iraq” increased from 32% in May/June 2007 to 52% in September 2008. However, 
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these totals mask wide variance by party. In February 2008, Gallup found that 70% of Republicans 
thought the surge was making the situation in Iraq better, but only 21% of Democrats agreed; 
another 31% of Democrats actually said the surge was making the situation worse.  
 
Study 1: Design, measures, and sample 
Why were some respondents misinformed about improvements in the situation in Iraq after the 
surge? To find out, we exposed respondents to a self-affirmation treatment that bolsters their 
perceptions of self-worth and thereby reduces the potentially threatening nature of uncomfortable 
facts. We also tested the effect of providing unambiguous information about the change in attacks 
after the surge. We expected this treatment would increase the accuracy of the public’s beliefs.  
Study 1 was a 2x2 between-subjects survey experiment. One manipulation randomly 
assigned respondents to an affirmation condition in which they were asked to recall an experience in 
which they felt good about themselves (Affirmation) or a control condition. The other manipulation 
assigned respondents to view a graph showing the decline in insurgent attacks in Iraq after the troop 
surge began (Graph) or to a control condition with no additional information. As noted above, this 
design differs from psychology studies of self-affirmation and motivated reasoning, which typically 
exposes all subjects to a given piece of information. In this study, however, we vary both Graph and 
Affirmation, allowing us to estimate their independent and joint effects. 
Our affirmation manipulation (adapted from Cohen et al. 2000) asked respondents in the 
treatment group to select the value that is most important to them from a list and then to write 
about a time in which it was “especially important to you and made you feel good about yourself.”2 
In the control condition, respondents instead reported what they had to eat or drink in the previous 
                                                
2 Writing about important values is common in self-affirmation studies (McQueen and Klein 2006). 
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48 hours. Our second experimental treatment is a graph showing the decline in attacks against U.S. 
and coalition forces in Iraq. The control group was given a summary of the surge but no 
information about its effects. (Stimulus materials are in the Online Appendix.)  
Our outcome of interest is factual beliefs about changes in attacks after the surge. After the 
manipulations, respondents were asked how the number of attacks changed on a five-point scale 
from “decreased substantially” to “increased substantially” (see Online Appendix for wording). As 
in each of our studies, responses were coded so that lower values indicate more accurate beliefs 
(attacks decreased) and higher values indicate greater misperceptions (attacks increased).  
Study 1 was part of a pre-election module on the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election 
Survey that was administered by YouGov/Polimetrix in October 2008. The dataset consists of an 
Internet sample of 1,000 people constructed from more than 50,000 opt-in respondents to 
approximate a random probability sample (Rivers N.d.). The sample closely resembles those 
obtained using traditional methods (see appendix for demographics).  
 
Study 1: Results 
Table 1 presents interactive models that allow the effect of Affirmation and Graph to vary by 
respondents’ support for withdrawing from Iraq. Specifically, we interact the treatments and their 
interaction with indicators for respondents who were not sure about withdrawing and those who 
support withdrawal (support for withdrawal is the omitted category). While previous research has 
found that the effectiveness of corrections may vary depending on respondent ideology, 
partisanship, or issue attitudes (e.g., Nyhan and Reifler 2010), our primary focus here is different; we 
examine whether our treatments significantly affect beliefs among these groups, especially those for 
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whom corrective information would be counter-attitudinal (i.e., withdrawal supporters). Separate 
subgroup models are provided in the Online Appendix for each study to facilitate interpretation.  
Each model is estimated as an ordered probit given the ordered dependent variable. We also 
use survey weights to maximize the representativeness of the estimates.3 Key results in each study 
are substantively identical when models are estimated without weights or controls or with outcome 
scales of increased/stayed the same/decreased (available upon request). 
 
  
                                                
3 We find no evidence of significant imbalance on covariates in balance tests (results available upon request). 
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Table 1: Misperceptions about post-surge change in insurgent attacks in Iraq  
  
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Affirmation -0.31 
                          (0.28) 
Graph -0.44 
                          (0.30) 
Not sure on Iraq withdrawal 0.91** 
 (0.29) 
Support Iraq withdrawal 1.26** 
 (0.23) 
Affirmation x not sure on withdrawal -0.02 
 (0.45) 
Affirmation x withdrawal support -0.07 
 (0.32) 
Graph x not sure on withdrawal -0.23 
 (0.44) 
Graph x withdrawal support -0.17 
 (0.33) 
Affirmation x graph 0.44 
 (0.43) 
Affirmation x graph x not sure on withdrawal -0.03 
 (0.70) 
Affirmation x graph x support withdrawal 0.11 
 (0.52) 
Black 0.10 
                          (0.23) 
Female 0.32** 
                          (0.11) 
College graduate -0.43** 
                          (0.12) 
GOP (with leaners) -0.12 
                          (0.16) 
Independent 0.39* 
                          (0.16) 
Iraq extremely important -0.23* 
                          (0.12) 
  
N                         987 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. Ordered probit models estimated using survey weights (as such, the log-likelihoods are not 
available); linearized standard errors in parentheses. Cutpoints omitted but available upon request. 
 
 Results from Table 1 show that the marginal effect of Graph alone is negative significant for 
withdrawal supporters, who are most likely to reject positive news (p < .01), as well as those who are 
not sure about withdrawal (p < .05). The effect of Graph for withdrawal opponents is also negative 
but not significant (p < .15), though we cannot directly reject the null of no difference in Graph 
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effects between withdrawal opponents and other groups (Gelman and Stern 2006). Finally, we find 
that the marginal effect of Graph is not significant among withdrawal supporters who received 
Affirmation, contradicting expectations from past research.4 
We also find that being Affirmed alone decreases misperceptions among those who support 
withdrawing from Iraq (p < .05) – the subgroup that would otherwise experience the greatest 
discomfort from answering the question correctly (though we cannot directly reject the null of no 
difference in effects between withdrawal supporters and other groups). However, the marginal effect 
of Affirmation – which was negative and significant among withdrawal supporters who did not 
receive any other information – is not significant for withdrawal supporters who also received Graph 
(this finding is discussed further below). No other subgroup is significantly affected, though we 
cannot reject the null of no difference between groups.5 
These results are best understood using predicted probabilities, which we calculate for 
respondents’ beliefs that insurgent attacks increased or stayed the same after the surge rather than 
decreased. Figure 1 presents a bar graph disaggregating respondents by position and condition.6 
 
  
                                                
4 The Affirmation x Graph interaction can be interpreted as either how the marginal effect of Affirmation varies 
by Graph or the converse. We largely focus on the latter. 
5 One concern in self-affirmation studies is that the results could be driven by an improvement in mood. We 
find no evidence Affirmation improved mood in any study (available upon request). 
6 The predicted values we present average over the other covariates in the sample. 
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Figure 1 
 
Predicted probabilities from the models in Appendix Table 2 estimated using survey weights.  
 
As expected, only a few withdrawal opponents say insurgent attacks increased or stayed the same; 
treatment effects in this subgroup were small. By contrast, the effect of Graph is dramatic among 
those respondents who are not sure about withdrawal from Iraq. The results are most striking, 
however, for withdrawal supporters. We see a large effect of Affirmation among those who did not 
receive Graph – the predicted probability of believing attacks increased or stayed the same during the 
surge drops from 56% to 40%. This decline of 16 percentage points is approximately two-thirds of 
the reduction in misperceptions observed among withdrawal supporters who received Graph but not 
Affirmation (33% of this group believed attacks increased or stayed the same versus 56% of controls). 
As noted above, however, we again cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in self-
affirmation effects between withdrawal supporters and opponents. In addition, Affirmation has no 
significant effect on misperceptions among withdrawal supporters who received Graph (38% said 
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attacks increased or stayed the same among those who received both Affirmation and Graph versus 
33% of those respondents who received only Graph).  
 
Study 1: Discussion 
These results help us understand the prevalence of false beliefs about the surge in Iraq. Graph 
reduced misperceptions for unaffirmed respondents regardless of their position on the war, 
suggesting that many people were uninformed about its success. Others, however, may have found it 
threatening to concede this point. Affirmation may have helped reduce misperceptions, including 
among respondents who would otherwise be least likely to accept the facts (withdrawal supporters), 
among people who did not receive Graph. However, the effects of Affirmation are limited. We cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of no difference in effects between withdrawal supporters and opponents. 
It also did not increase the marginal effect of Graph as previous research would suggest. 
Study 1 also has notable limitations. First, it would be desirable to establish that the 
beneficial effects of Affirmation and Graph hold for a conservative or Republican misperception. 
Also, the salience of the Iraq issue changed between the design and fielding of the study, which may 
have reduced the incentive for motivated reasoning. Elite Democrats came to accept that that the 
counterinsurgency strategy was a success and shifted the focus of their criticisms of the Bush 
administration to the economic crisis that was ongoing at the time of the study (October 2008). 
 
Study 2: Job change under President Obama 
To address the concerns described above, we designed a second experiment that focused on beliefs 
about the state of the economy during a period of intense partisan debate over the merits of 
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President Obama’s economic policies. In addition, the change in party control of the presidency in 
2009 allows us to reverse the partisan dynamic from Study 1. 
We selected this issue because the economy was most salient issue in national politics at the 
time. At the time Study 2 was conducted (February 2011), the economy dominated polls as the most 
important problem facing the country. We specifically focused on beliefs about job growth (or 
losses) because these measures, which are reported monthly, are an easily understood indicator of 
the direction of the economy. We expected to see widespread divergence in beliefs about changes in 
the number of jobs under Obama because the state of the economy is a factual issue that lends itself 
to biased processing (Bartels 2002). This expectation of divergence in perceptions of the economy is 
supported by a November 2010 WorldPublicOpinion.org poll which found 72% of Republicans said 
that the economy is getting worse compared with only 36% of Democrats.  
 
Study 2: Design, measures, and sample 
Our 2x2 design closely mirrors Study 1. Respondents are randomly assigned to a self-affirmation 
condition (Affirmation) or to a control condition and separately randomly assigned to receive a graph 
of job growth (Graph) or to a control condition. The self-affirmation and corresponding control 
condition are virtually identical to Study 1 except for the inclusion of several more choices of values 
in the self-affirmation exercise. The information treatment is a graph showing how payroll jobs 
increased from 129.3 million in January 2010 to 130.3 million in January 2011.   
Our outcome measure is adapted from American National Election Study (ANES) questions 
on economic trends (Bartels 2002) asking if the number of people with jobs in the country has gone 
up, stayed about the same, or gone down since January 2010. Using branching followups, we 
constructed a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Gone up a lot” to “Gone down a lot.” As in 
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each study, responses were coded so that higher values represent greater misperceptions (i.e., greater 
belief that jobs had gone down).7 We also captured response time information for answers to the 
outcome question above (measured in seconds).8 This study was conducted using Qualtrics with 
participants from Mechanical Turk. 
 
Study 2: Results 
We present interactive models in the main text and separate subgroup models in the Online 
Appendix.9 In this case, we measure attitudes using a pre-treatment question about approval of 
President Obama’s job performance on the economy and split the sample into those who approve, 
disapprove, and those who neither approve nor disapprove. The results of that analysis did not 
reveal the expected effect for self-affirmation among respondents who disapproved of Obama’s 
handling of the economy (available upon request). As an exploratory step, we therefore also 
disaggregated the data by whether respondents selected job creation and economic growth as the 
most important issue facing the country or not (47% did so) following Correll et al. (2004), who find 
self-affirmation effects were concentrated among those for whom the issue is most important.  
We found that this measure moderates the effects of Affirmation among disapprovers. Table 
2 therefore presents results from ordered probit models of beliefs about job change within 
subgroups defined by respondents’ approval of Obama on the economy and whether they said it 
                                                
7 These results are robust to using a three-point outcome variable of “gone up,” “stayed about the same,” or 
“gone down” (available upon request). Figure 2 similarly presents the predicted probability of respondents 
saying the number of jobs went down or stayed the same. 
8 Equivalent response time information is not available from Study 1 or Study 3. 
9 Specifically, we estimate separate three-way interaction models for respondents exposed to Graph and 
those who were not. (Four-way interaction models do not facilitate exposition.) 
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was the most important issue.10 We find that Graph has a strong corrective effect for each subgroup 
among respondents who did not receive Affirmation (p < .01). The marginal effect of Graph remains 
negative and significant (p < .05) among respondents who received Affirmation across each model 
but did not increase as prior research would suggest. In contrast, Affirmation significantly reduces 
misperceptions only when respondents’ prior attitude is in conflict with the factual outcome in 
question – those who disapprove of Obama on the economy and view the economy as the most 
important issue (p < .05) – and they did not receive Graph. 
 
  
                                                
10 In these models and those reported in Study 3 below, we include heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, 
which could not be used in Study 1 due to the survey weights from CCES. 
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Table 2: Misperceptions about job change under Obama (Jan. 2010-Jan. 2011) 
  Graph=0 Graph=1 
Affirmation 0.48 -0.56 
                          (0.42) (0.38) 
Economy most important issue 0.50 0.27 
                          (0.41) (0.38) 
Neither approve nor disapprove of Obama on 
economy 0.38 -0.40 
 (0.40) (0.39) 
Disapprove of Obama on economy -0.23 -0.83* 
 (0.41) (0.37) 
Affirmation x most important issue -1.05 0.17 
 (0.58) (0.53) 
Affirmation x neither approve nor disapprove -0.81 0.88 
 (0.60) (0.59) 
Affirmation x disapprove -0.64 0.86 
 (0.52) (0.47) 
Neither approve nor disapprove x most important 0.38 -0.25 
 (0.40) (0.52) 
Disapprove x most important -1.36** -0.13 
 (0.53) (0.49) 
Affirmation x neither x most important 0.77 -0.02 
 (0.78) (0.79) 
Affirmation x disapprove x most important 2.25** -0.59 
 (0.75) (0.72) 
Black 0.12 -0.88* 
                          (0.37) (0.42) 
Female -0.33* -0.12 
                          (0.15) (0.15) 
College graduate 0.45** 0.01 
                          (0.15) (0.15) 
GOP (with leaners) -0.25 0.07 
                          (0.22) (0.21) 
Independent -0.32 -0.68** 
                          (0.23) (0.22) 
   
N                         224 247 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. Ordered probit models with robust standard errors in parentheses. Cutpoints omitted but available 
upon request. 
 
 
To illustrate the results above, we calculate predicted probabilities that respondents will 
incorrectly state the number of jobs decreased or stayed the same for the four experimental 
conditions averaging over the other covariates. To simplify presentation, we focus on those who 
disapprove of Obama on the economy – the group of greatest theoretical and substantive interest.  
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Figure 2 
  
Predicted probabilities from the models in Appendix Table 3.  
 
As Figure 2 shows, Affirmation substantially reduced misperceptions among Obama disapprovers for 
whom the economy is most important. Among respondents who did not receive Graph, the 
predicted likelihood of saying jobs went down or stayed the same since January 2010 declines from 
93% among those who were not affirmed to 69% among those who were. The effect of Affirmation 
among those who instead received Graph was negligible. By this measure, Affirmation closes 
approximately one-third of the gap in misperceptions between the no-affirmation, no-graph baseline 
and those respondents who received Graph. 
 We have suggested that Affirmation works by reducing the identity threat posed by attitude-
inconsistent facts by buttressing people’s self-worth, allowing them to more thoughtfully or carefully 
consider the evidence. The availability of response time data for the dependent variable in this study 
allows us to provide evidence to support this mechanism. The results above indicate the Affirmation 
reduced misperceptions among respondents who disapproved of Obama on the economy and saw it 
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as the most important issue facing the country, but not those who thought another issue was more 
important. The response time data is consistent with this finding. Members of the 
disapproving/most important subgroup who were affirmed spent 5.1 additional seconds on their 
response (t = 2.01, p<.06) – an increase of more than one standard deviation. No equivalent effect 
was seen for those who disapproved on the economy but saw another issue as more important. 
 
Study 2: Discussion 
These results support the findings of Study 1, which suggest that people face significant information 
deficits that can be reduced by graphical corrective information. This finding holds even among 
those respondents who disapprove of Obama on economic matters. Our results also address a key 
limitation of the previous study by focusing on an especially salient political issue.  
 We also find results similar to Study 1 for the effect of Affirmation alone, which suggests that 
misperceptions are fueled in part by the threatening nature of accurate information. Affirmation again 
reduces misperceptions among those who are most likely to be threatened by the correct answer. In 
this case, however, its effects are limited to those who say the economy is the most important issue 
– an exploratory result but one that is consistent with theory and previous research.  
 
Study 3: Global temperature change 
We conducted one additional experiment to address several remaining questions. Studies 1 and 2 
found that graphical information significantly reduced misperceptions relative to a control condition, 
but do not directly compare the effects of alternate modes in presenting the same information.11 In 
                                                
11 Previously, we relied on a comparison between the effectiveness of graphical corrections in Studies 1 and 2 
and results reported in previous studies using textual corrections. This study directly tests graphs versus 
textual information with the same sample, issue, outcome question, etc. 
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this study, we test the effects of graphical and textual presentations of temperature data on beliefs 
about climate change and global warming – another issue with high levels of partisan polarization 
(McCright and Dunlap 2011) and strong evidence of motivated reasoning (Hart and Nisbet 2012). 
 This approach also allows us to address several possible concerns about our previous 
studies. First, both studies asked about factual beliefs on questions where the accurate answer could 
be seen as good news, which might be affectively congruent with self-affirmation or facilitate 
acceptance of corrective information. The study below tests whether these effects hold when 
increased accuracy instead requires greater acceptance of bad news (increased global temperatures). 
In addition, the effectiveness of the graphical corrections in Studies 1 and 2 might have been the 
result of respondents’ willingness to accept information from the government. In this study, the 
information source is identical in the correction conditions, allowing us to hold source fixed.  
 
Study 3: Design, measures, and sample 
Our approach closely mirrors Studies 1 and 2 but adds a textual information condition. We use a 
2x3 design in which participants are independently randomly assigned to either a self-affirmation 
condition (Affirmation) or a non-affirmation control in one manipulation and assigned to a graphical 
information condition (a graph of change in global average temperature – Graph), a textual 
information condition (a paragraph describing the temperature change – Text), or a control 
condition (neither graph nor text). Our design therefore directly tests the hypothesis that graphs 
reduce misperceptions more effectively than equivalent text. 
The self-affirmation treatment and control conditions are identical to those in Study 2. Our 
graph treatment is adapted from a line graph in a NASA press release 
(http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/news/20110113) showing the difference in average global 
 
 
20 
temperature relative to a baseline period from 1940 to 2010 from four climate data sources. The 
textual treatment describing the data was adapted from language in the release.  
In this study, we measure respondents’ perceptions of global temperature change as well as 
their more general beliefs about global warming, a more politically salient topic where people might 
be more prone to motivated reasoning. The first outcome measure, Temperature change, asks if average 
global surface temperatures have gone up, stayed about the same, or gone down in the last thirty 
years. Using branching follow-ups, we construct a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Gone down 
a lot” to “Gone up a lot” where higher values indicate greater misperceptions (temperatures 
decreased significantly). Our second dependent variable, Global warming, asks respondents whether 
they believe global warming is a theory that has not yet been proven, a proven fact caused mostly by 
natural changes that have nothing to do with emissions from cars and industrial facilities, or a 
proven fact mostly caused by emissions from cars and industrial facilities. We ask this question 
before and after the experimental manipulations (the pre-treatment question is a control variable in 
analyses below). Both variables are coded so that higher values represent more misinformed views. 
We consider both dependent variables to be measures of misperceptions. Temperature change 
measures whether respondents accurately perceive the observed pattern of changes in average global 
surface temperatures Global warming measures broader beliefs about evidence for and causes of 
climate change that conflict with overwhelming scientific consensus. However, because the stimuli 
in Graph and Text only concern temperature change, we only define choosing “a theory that has not 
yet been proven” as a misperception (which sets aside respondent beliefs about the role of humans).   
 The study was conducted in July-August 2011 using an online convenience sample from 
Qualtrics.com’s respondent panel. We limited this sample to respondents who previously self-
identified as Republicans, the group that is most likely to hold inaccurate beliefs about global 
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warming (McCright and Dunlap 2011). We also excluded respondents who failed to pass a pre-
treatment attention filter designed to make sure that subjects were carefully reading survey questions 
(see the appendix for discussion of sample demographics). 
 
Study 3: Results 
As before, we examine results within different subgroups, which in this case are groups within our 
sample of self-identified Republicans, and present interactive models in the Online Appendix. One 
important contextual difference from previous studies is that Studies 1 and 2 focused on so-called 
“easy” issues (Carmines and Stimson 1980). In this case, however, the issue is “hard” in that the 
issue involves contextual nuance, technical knowledge, and subtle differences between the possible 
policy responses. Because of clear cues from party elites on the issue of global warming, we 
therefore instead tested whether strong Republicans are more likely to be threatened by information 
showing rising global temperatures – a fact that contradicts claims from many party elites 
questioning whether climate change is real. We therefore instead split the sample based on how 
strongly the respondents identify with the GOP. Control variables are nearly identical to Study 1.12  
Table 3 presents results of our ordered probit models of Temperature change and Global warming. As 
above, we estimate interactive models but also present separate subgroup models in the Online 
Appendix to facilitate interpretation. In this case, we differentiate the sample by identification as 
strong Republicans (all are GOP identifiers). We find that Graph alone is effective – it reduces 
misperceptions about temperature change for both groups (p < .01). It also makes Republicans who 
don’t identify strongly with their party more likely to acknowledge global warming as real and man-
made (p < .05) unlike strong Republicans, who are not measurably affected. However, we cannot 
                                                
12 We exclude an indicator for black respondents (only two are in the sample). 
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reject the null of no difference in effects between them directly (p < .16). By comparison, Text does 
not significantly change respondents’ beliefs about temperature change or global warming. When we 
compare marginal effects, we find that Graph alone is more effective at reducing misperceptions 
about temperature change than Text alone for both groups of Republicans (p < .01) but we observe 
no measurable difference in effects on more general beliefs about global warming for either group.13  
 
Table 3: Misperceptions about temperature change and its causes 
  Temperature change 
Global 
warming/causes 
Affirmation -0.51 -0.55 
 (0.29) (0.31) 
Graph -1.22** -0.64* 
 (0.29) (0.29) 
Text -0.36 -0.44 
 (0.24) (0.28) 
Strong Republican -0.28 -0.24 
 (0.31) (0.28) 
Affirmation x graph 0.74 0.93* 
 (0.42) (0.43) 
Affirmation x text 0.38 0.49 
 (0.39) (0.47) 
Affirmation x strong Republican 0.98* 0.81 
 (0.43) (0.42) 
Graph x strong Republican 0.32 0.57 
 (0.43) (0.40) 
Text x strong Republican 0.46 0.63 
 (0.38) (0.42) 
Affirmation x graph x strong Republican -1.27* -1.56* 
 (0.62) (0.58) 
Affirmation x text x strong Republican -1.20* -1.02 
 (0.57) (0.63) 
Female -0.25* 0.00 
 (0.12) (0.13) 
College graduate 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.12) (0.13) 
Extremely important issue -0.38 -0.60* 
 (0.31) (0.24) 
   
N                         356 357 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. Ordered probit models with robust standard errors in parentheses. Cutpoints omitted but available 
upon request. 
 
 
                                                
13 This finding do not seem to result from differences in processing – a post-treatment recall question found 
few significant differences between Text and Graph and no difference in reading time (available upon request). 
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 In addition, Affirmation somewhat reduces misperceptions for both groups of Republicans, 
but in different ways. Contrary to expectations, Affirmation somewhat decreases the likelihood that 
non-strong Republicans who did not receive Graph or Text will reject the scientific consensus on 
Global warming (p < .10), an effect that is measurably different from that observed among strong 
Republicans (p < .05). Also, as in Study 1, the Affirmation x graph interaction is in the opposite 
direction from expectations and marginally significant for non-strong Republicans (p<.06).  
 
Figure 3 
 
Predicted probabilities from the models in Appendix Table 4.  
 
 
By contrast, while the effect of Affirmation alone is not significant for strong Republicans, it has a 
suggestive effect when combined with Graph. The effect of Graph on global warming beliefs is 
significant for this subgroup when respondents are affirmed (p<.05) but not otherwise, a difference 
that is nearly statistically significant (p<.11). 
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 Figure 3 presents predicted probabilities that respondents will say temperatures have 
decreased or stayed the same (averaging over other covariates). Misperceptions are lower with Graph 
than with either Text or a control for both strong Republicans (35% for controls, 12% in Graph) and 
other Republicans (49% for controls, 10% in Graph). We also observe a decrease in misperceptions 
for affirmation among Republicans who don’t identify strongly with their party (49% to 29%). 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
  
Predicted probabilities from the models in Appendix Table 4.  
 
Since our stimuli only directly address temperature change (and not the role of humans), we 
calculate predicted probability of belief that “Global warming is just a theory” in Figure 4.  Among 
those who are not strong Republicans, the predicted probability of this belief declines from 65% 
among controls to 45% among those who were affirmed and 41% among those who received Graph.  
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In addition, for strong Republicans, agreement declines from 50% among unaffirmed 
controls and 48% with Graph alone to 33% among those who received Graph and were affirmed.  
 
Study 3: Discussion 
The results of Study 3 are consistent with the findings of Studies 1 and 2 in suggesting that some 
people suffer from information deficits but that others may also be threatened by accurate 
information. When we directly compare the effectiveness of Graph and Text at reducing information 
deficits, we find that a graphical correction decreases misperceptions about temperature change 
more than an equivalent text correction, which is consistent with the observed contrast between 
Studies 1 and 2 (in which Graph was effective at reducing misperceptions) and previous studies that 
found corrective text about controversial issues to often be ineffective (e.g., Nyhan and Reifler 
2010). We also observe some partial evidence that Affirmation can help reduce misperceptions among 
Republicans who do not identify strongly with their party, but as in Study 1, this effect is not 
significantly different from that observed among strong Republicans. Finally, unlike in Studies 1 and 
2, however, Affirmation seems to improve respondents’ receptivity to corrective information among 
strong Republicans; the marginal effect of the Graph treatment significantly reduces misperceptions 
only among those respondents who were affirmed.  
Our interpretation of these results is that Affirmation can make it easier to cope with 
dissonant information that one has already encountered about controversial misperceptions, relaxing 
people’s need to reject facts that could otherwise be threatening. We also find some evidence that 
Affirmation increases receptivity to new information (Graph) that might otherwise be resisted. 
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Conclusion  
We find that providing participants with graphical information significantly decreases false and 
unsupported factual beliefs versus controls (Studies 1 and 2) and versus equivalent textual 
information (Study 3). The threatening nature of corrections may also cause people to reject 
counter-attitudinal information. Here, our results are less consistent. Affirming respondents’ self-
worth can in some cases reduce misperceptions for those who are most likely to be misinformed, 
but these effects often do not significantly differ from those observed in other subgroups. 
Moreover, self-affirmation does not consistently increase receptivity to corrective information as 
previous research suggests. 
These results have several important implications. First, misperceptions are not simply a 
result of information deficits. Providing correct information did not eliminate false or unsupported 
beliefs; many respondents continued to hold false beliefs, which suggests psychological factors also 
play an important role. Second, information deficits can be reduced. Consistent with prior research 
on the effectiveness of graphical information in place of tables (e.g., Meyer et al. 1999), graphical 
corrections appear to be more effective than text at reducing misperceptions. This finding suggests 
that the format in which information is presented matters. Our positive finding is consistent with 
the broader literature about visual statistical learning (e.g., Fiser and Aslin 2002; Turk-Browne et al. 
2005).  Third, our affirmation results provide limited evidence that some people may already 
implicitly know the facts or are capable of making more accurate inferences if buttressed against 
identity threats. However, we find little evidence that self-affirmation makes people more open-
minded when they receive corrective information directly – a result that conflicts with prior findings 
in social psychology. Importantly, this disappointing result does not appear to unique to our study. 
Others have similarly found that self-affirmation has had little effect in reducing polarization 
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(Levendusky N.d.), selective exposure (Stroud N.d.; Lyons N.d.), and misperceptions (Lyons N.d.). 
We cannot definitively explain why self-affirmation failed to have the anticipated effect but wish to 
highlight these results given recent concerns about reproducibility in psychology (Gelman 2016). 
Several explanations are worth considering. First, the premise that people engage in worldview-
consistent motivated reasoning in response to corrective information may be incorrect. The second 
possibility is that affirmation manipulations are not that powerful in the presence of an information 
stimulus. Finally, our studies only contained limited measures of attention. It is possible that 
respondent inattention or a lack of engagement with the manipulation somehow attenuated the 
effect of the self-affirmation or changed how it interacted with corrective information.  
Other limitations of our study should be noted. First, while we find that graphs substantially 
reduce misperceptions, our studies were not designed to examine why they are so effective. 
Congruence between the presentation of the information and the structure of the data appears to 
help make graphs effective (Meyer et al 1999; Zacks and Tversky 1999), but further research is 
needed to investigate how the processing of graphical and textual corrections differs. For instance, 
evidence suggests that visual statistical learning is not governed by automaticity; learning requires 
attention (Turk-Browne et al. 2005). We therefore strongly encourage future research on the extent 
to which learning is automatic for graphs compared to text and how much attention is necessary for 
learning to occur from each. Similarly, future research should explore whether graphics and text 
require differing levels of cognitive effort and whether these differences exacerbate or ameliorate 
directionally motivated reasoning about political information and facts. In addition, future research 
should examine the durability of the treatment effects we observe – a question we did not examine.  
Still, these results provide some reason for optimism. Though providing information does 
not automatically lead people to update their factual beliefs, people can change what they believe 
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under certain circumstances even about controversial issues. It is our hope that future research will 
continue to explore the specifics of what types of information lead to belief change and the effects 
of context and mindset on how it is processed.   
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Online appendix 
 
Study 1 
 
Affirmation treatment 
 
[Part 1]  
 
In this portion of the study, we would like to ask you some questions about your ideas, your beliefs, 
and your life. When you respond to these questions, please bear in mind that there are no right or 
wrong answers. 
 
Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be important to you, some of which 
may be unimportant. Looking at this list, please circle the characteristic or value that is MOST 
important to you.  
 
1. Being smart or getting good grades  
2. Creativity  
3. Relationships with friends or family  
4. Social skills 
5. Business skills 
 
[Part 2]  
 
In a few sentences, please describe a personal experience in which [value choice from previous 
question] was especially important to you and made you feel good about yourself. Focus on your 
thoughts and feelings, and don't worry about spelling, grammar, or how well written it is. 
 
Affirmation control 
 
Please list everything you have had to eat or drink in the last 48 hours. Do not worry about those 
things you find yourself unable to remember.  
 
Graph treatment 
 
[All respondents] 
 
Now we would like to turn to a different topic. As you may know, starting in early 2007, the US sent 
an additional 30,000 troops to Iraq. Many people refer to this increase in the number of US troops 
in Iraq as "the surge" or "the troop surge."   
 
[Treatment group only] 
 
Below is a graph showing the number of insurgent attacks against US and coalition forces in Iraq per 
week since January 2004. Please take a moment to study it before proceeding. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
From what you know about the US involvement in Iraq, what has happened to the number of 
insurgent attacks in Iraq since the recent increase in troop levels (“the surge”) began?  
 
● Attacks have decreased substantially [1] 
● Attacks have decreased slightly [2] 
● Attacks have stayed the same [3] 
● Attacks have increased slightly [4] 
● Attacks have increased substantially [5] 
 
 
Study 2 
 
Affirmation treatment 
 
[Part 1] 
 
In this portion of the study, we would like to ask you some questions about your ideas, your beliefs, 
and your life. When you respond to these questions, please bear in mind that there are no right or 
wrong answers. Your answers will be kept confidential and not published in any form. 
  
 
 
Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be important to you, some of which 
may be unimportant. Looking at this list, please select the characteristic or value that is MOST 
important to you. 
  
● Athletic ability 
● Being good at art 
● Being smart or getting good grades 
● Creativity 
● Living in the moment 
● Musical ability/appreciation 
● Relationships with friends or family 
● Sense of humor 
● Social skills 
● Physical attractiveness 
● Business skills 
● Romantic values 
 
[Part 2] 
 
Please take a few minutes to describe a personal experience in which [value choice from previous 
question] was especially important to you and made you feel good about yourself. Focus on your 
thoughts and feelings, and don't worry about spelling, grammar, or how well written it is. Your 
answers will be kept confidential and not published in any form.  
  
NOTE: The survey will allow you to move to the next page after a reasonable amount of time has 
elapsed. Please take all the time you need to answer the question thoroughly. 
 
Affirmation control 
 
Please take a few minutes to list everything you've had to eat or drink in the last 24 hours. Don't 
worry about spelling, grammar, or how well written it is. Your answers will be kept confidential and 
not published in any form. 
  
NOTE: The survey will allow you to move to the next page after a reasonable amount of time has 
elapsed. Please take all the time you need to answer the question thoroughly. 
 
Graph treatment 
 
Now we would like to turn to a different topic.  
 
Below is a graph showing the total number of jobs in the United States from January 2010 to 
January 2011. Please take a moment to study it before proceeding. 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The survey will allow you to move to the next page after a reasonable amount of time has 
elapsed. Please take all the time you need to study the graph below. 
 
Graph control 
 
Now we would like to turn to a different topic.  
 
Dependent variable 
 
Would you say that, compared to January 2010, the number of people with jobs in the country has 
gone up, stayed about the same, or gone down? 
-Gone up 
-Stayed about the same [3] 
-Gone down 
 
[branching] 
Compared to January 2010, has the number of people with jobs in the country gone up a lot or only 
somewhat?  
-Gone up a lot [1] 
-Gone up somewhat [2] 
 
Compared to January 2010, has the number of people with jobs in the country gone down a lot or 
only somewhat?  
-Gone down a lot [4] 
 
 
-Gone down somewhat [5] 
 
Study 3 
 
Attention filter 
 
Recent research on decision-making shows that choices are affected by context. Differences in how 
people feel, their previous knowledge and experience, and their environment can affect choices. To 
help us understand how people make decisions, we are interested in information about you. 
Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, 
some results may not tell us very much about decision making in the real world. To show that you 
have read the instructions, please ignore the question below about your favorite color and check 
pink and green as your answers. Again, please answer the question as we have instructed rather than 
choosing your favorite color. Thank you very much. 
 
Please indicate your favorite color. 
-Red  
-Pink       
-Orange     
-Brown 
-Yellow  
-Green 
-Blue 
-Purple 
-None of the above 
 
Graph treatment 
 
Now we would like to turn to a different topic.  
 
Below is a graph showing changes in average global surface temperatures since 1940. Please take a 
moment to study it before proceeding. (Note: A change of 1 degree Celsius = 1.8 degrees 
Fahrenheit.) 
 
 
 
 
 
Text treatment 
 
Now we would like to turn to a different topic. 
  
Below is information about changes in average global surface temperatures since 1940. Please take a 
moment to study it before proceeding. (Note: A change of 1 degree Celsius = 1.8 degrees 
Fahrenheit.) 
  
Groups of scientists from several major institutions — NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Climatic Data Center, the 
Japanese Meteorological Agency and the Met Office Hadley Centre in the United Kingdom — tally 
data collected by temperature monitoring stations spread around the world. All four records show 
peaks and valleys that vary in virtual sync with each other. They each show an increase in average 
global surface temperatures of approximately 0.5 degrees Celsius over the last three decades. Data 
from each source also indicate that the last decade is the warmest since 1940. 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph/text control group 
 
Now we would like to turn to a different topic.  
 
Dependent variables 
 
Would you say that average global surface temperatures have gone up, stayed about the same, or 
gone down in the last thirty years? 
-Gone up 
-Stayed about the same [3] 
-Gone down 
 
[branching] 
Have average global surface temperatures gone up a lot or only somewhat in the last thirty years?  
-Gone up a lot [1] 
-Gone up somewhat [2] 
 
Have average global surface temperatures gone down a lot or only somewhat in the last thirty years? 
-Gone down a lot [4] 
-Gone down somewhat [5] 
 
Which of the following statements comes closest to your view of global warming?  
-Global warming is a proven fact and is mostly caused by emissions from cars and industrial facilities 
such as power plants and factories. [1] 
-Global warming is a proven fact caused mostly by natural changes that have nothing to do with 
emissions from cars and industrial facilities. [2] 
-Global warming is a theory that has not yet been proven. [3] 
  
 
 
Sample composition 
 
CCES (Study 1) 
 
Overall, the sample is representative of the American population and matches known benchmarks 
well. Respondents are 48% male and 52% female. 72% are white, 12% are black, and 8% are 
Hispanic. 32% are age 18-34, 37% are 35-54, and 32% are 55 or older. Finally, 43% have a high 
school degree or less, 32% have some college or a two-year degree, and 25% have a four-year college 
degree or more.  
 
In terms of party identification, our respondents are 37% Democrats, 27% independents (including 
leaners and identifiers of other parties), 27% Republicans, and 8% not sure, which almost perfectly 
matches the partisan distribution from telephone polls conducted in October 2008. To obtain the 
relevant estimates for how our party estimates match the party distribution of public polling (36% 
Democrat, 30% independent, and 26% Republican), go to 
http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/party-identification, include only live phone polls with 
non-partisan sponsors, and set the date range to October 1 to October 31, 2008. 
 
CCES respondents may be somewhat more sophisticated or politically active than those in a 
probability sample, but such discrepancies should not threaten the internal validity of our 
experimental results.  
 
Mechanical Turk (Study 2) 
 
In line with previous research about Mechanical Turk, our sample is younger and more liberal than 
the national population, but more diverse than standard student-based convenience samples. In our 
sample, 41% of respondents were 18-29, 43% were 30-49, and 16% were 50 and over. 56% were 
female, 4% were black, and 5% Hispanic. 10% had a high school degree or less, 33% had some 
college, and 58% had a college degree or greater. 53% identified as Democrats (with leaners), 30% as 
Republicans (with leaners), and 16% as independents. 
 
Qualtrics (Study 3) 
 
This study restricted was restricted to self-identified Republicans in an online convenience sample 
obtained from Qualtrics. As an initial check on data quality, we asked the standard ANES party 
identification questions. The data match the screening almost perfectly. Only five respondents (1%) 
self-identify as Democrats or Democratic leaners, while 2% identify as pure independents. The 
remaining 97% identify as Republicans – 48% as strong Republicans, 43% as weak Republicans, and 
5% as Republican-leaning independents. The sample is less racially diverse (95% white) than Study 
2, which was not pre-screened on party identification. However, we still see diversity in other 
demographics. For instance, the sample is slightly more female (51%) than male (49%) and more 
diverse by age than respondents in Study 2. 
  
 
 
Appendix Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
  Control Affirmation Graph Text 
Aff. x 
graph 
Aff. x 
text Total 
Change in insurgent 
attacks         
Mean (weighted) 2.27 2.06 1.79  2.05  2.04 
SE of mean (weighted) 0.12 0.13 0.08  0.16  0.07 
N (unweighted) 251 219 270  260  1000 
          
Job change under 
Obama         
Mean 2.88 2.88 4.03  3.98  3.47 
SE of the mean 0.10 0.09 0.06  0.09  0.05 
N 119 105 140  108  472 
          
Temperature change         
Mean 2.38 2.34 1.71 2.27 1.76 2.13 2.10 
SE of the mean 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.04 
N 64 50 55 67 68 55 359 
          
Global warming/causes         
Mean 2.39 2.26 2.13 2.27 2.10 2.18 2.22 
SE of the mean 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.05 
N 64 50 55 67 68 55 359 
 
  
 
 
Appendix Table 2 
Study 1: Misperceptions about post-surge change in insurgent attacks in Iraq  
  
Oppose 
withdrawal 
Not  
sure 
Support 
withdrawal 
Affirmation -0.31 -0.17 -0.41* 
                          (0.25) (0.34) (0.17) 
Graph -0.41 -0.67* -0.63** 
                          (0.28) (0.32) (0.16) 
Affirmation x graph 0.45 0.25 0.57* 
                          (0.40) (0.53) (0.28) 
Black 0.66 -0.32 0.17 
                          (0.52) (0.48) (0.28) 
Female 0.47* 0.46 0.22 
                          (0.20) (0.33) (0.15) 
College graduate -0.44 -0.49 -0.41** 
                          (0.24) (0.41) (0.13) 
GOP (with leaners) -0.62* 0.19 -0.11 
                          (0.24) (0.29) (0.27) 
Independent -0.18 0.31 0.47* 
                          (0.34) (0.35) (0.21) 
Iraq extremely important -0.15 -0.19 -0.24 
                          (0.23) (0.34) (0.15) 
    
N                         399 121 467 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. Ordered probit models estimated using survey weights. Cutpoints omitted but 
available upon request. 
  
 
 
Appendix Table 3 
Study 2: Misperceptions about job change under Obama (Jan. 2010-Jan. 2011) 
 Approve  Neither Disapprove 
  Not MIP MIP Not MIP MIP Not MIP MIP 
Affirmation -0.39 0.51 0.41 0.61 0.09 -1.04* 
                         (0.35) (0.49) (0.46) (0.34) (0.27) (0.42) 
Graph -1.71** -1.52** -0.83* -1.85** -1.69** -2.27** 
                          (0.43) (0.38) (0.36) (0.38) (0.31) (0.51) 
Affirmation x graph 0.94 -0.07 -0.61 -1.29* -0.34 1.06 
                          (0.51) (0.58) (0.72) (0.57) (0.42) (0.58) 
Black 0.48 0.24 0.92 -0.46 2.90** -0.14 
                          (0.35) (0.38) (0.69) (0.81) (1.09) (0.65) 
Female 0.24 0.33 0.52 -0.14 0.02 0.39 
                          (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.25) (0.21) (0.26) 
College graduate -0.62 -0.17 0.63* -0.51* -0.16 -0.63* 
                          (0.33) (0.30) (0.31) (0.26) (0.21) (0.26) 
GOP (with leaners)   0.25 -0.17 0.26 -0.57* 
                            (0.36) (0.28) (0.36) (0.26) 
Independent                     0.97 0.91 0.47 0.43 0.42 -0.43 
                          (0.65) (0.47) (0.40) (0.32) (0.41) (0.61) 
       
N                         66 72 59 90 113 71 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. Ordered probit models with robust standard errors in parentheses. Cutpoints 
omitted but available upon request. 
 
  
 
 
Appendix Table 4 
Study 3: Misperceptions about temperature change and its causes 
      Temperature change                                 Global warming/causes 
  Not strong GOP Strong GOP Not strong GOP Strong GOP 
Affirmation -0.52 0.44 -0.52 0.29 
                         (0.30) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30) 
Graph -1.27** -0.85** -0.62* -0.07 
                          (0.30) (0.32) (0.27) (0.29) 
Text -0.41 0.19 -0.41 0.20 
                          (0.24) (0.29) (0.27) (0.33) 
Affirmation x graph 0.72 -0.51 0.85* -0.68 
                          (0.42) (0.44) (0.41) (0.42) 
Affirmation x text 0.39 -0.86* 0.45 -0.59 
                          (0.39) (0.41) (0.45) (0.45) 
Female -0.05 -0.47** -0.05 0.08 
                          (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) 
College graduate -0.21 0.24 -0.04 0.04 
                          (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) 
Extremely imp. issue -0.27 -0.52 -0.44 -0.78* 
                          (0.45) (0.40) (0.34) (0.33) 
     
N                         184 173 185 173 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. Ordered probit models with robust standard errors in parentheses. Cutpoints 
omitted but available upon request. 
 
 
 
